Low budget cryptography to enable wireless security

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with input from:
current and former Ph.D. students

Outline: embedded security

- Settings: applications
- Design goals: area - time - energy/power
- Cost of wireless link
- Cost of crypto primitives
- Example(s)
- Conclusions & Future work

Embedded crypto everywhere

Ari Juels: RFID tracking problem

The consumer privacy problem

IMEC: Human++ project


Embedded crypto everywhere

IMEC: NERF - brain stimulant

Deep Brain stimulation
[Sources: J. Rabaey, National Institutes of Health, Neurology journal]

Embedded crypto: challenge (1)

Old Model (simplified view):
-**Attack on channel between communicating parties**
-**Encryption and cryptographic operations in black boxes**
-**Protection by strong mathematic algorithms and protocols**

Embedded crypto: challenge (2)

New Model (also simplified view):
-**Attack channel *and* endpoints**
-**Encryption and cryptographic operations in gray boxes**
-**Protection by strong mathematic algorithms and protocols**
-**Protection by secure implementation**

Need secure implementations not only algorithms

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Embedded crypto: challenge (3)

NEED BOTH

- Efficient, lightweight implementations
  - Within power, area, timing budgets
  - Public key: 2048 bits RSA, 200 bit ECC on 8 bit μC and 100 μW
  - Public key on a passive RFID tag

- Trustworthy implementation
  - Resistant to attacks
  - Active attacks: probing, power glitches, JTAG scan chain
  - Passive attacks: side channel attacks

Design Parameters

Measures for security?

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Cost definition

- Area
- Time
- Power, Energy
- Physical Security
- NRE (Non Recurring Engineering) cost

Design parameters

- Speed or throughput:
  - HW: Gbits/sec or Mbits/sec/slice
  - SW: Cycles/byte, independent of clock frequency
- Area:
  - HW: mm2 (gate or transistor count)
  - SW: memory footprint
- Power or energy consumption:
  - Power (Watts) for cooling or transmission (RFID)
  - Energy (Joule): battery operated devices
- Security, resistance to attacks: difficult to measure, but still we want it …
  - Entropy, leakage functions?
  - Measurements until disclosure?
  - Cost versus benefit

Throughput: Real-time

• Extremely high throughput (Radar or fiber optics)
  • One operator (= hardware unit, e.g. adder, shifter, register)
  • for each operation (= algorithmic, e.g. addition, multiplication, delay)

$\Longrightarrow$ | clock frequency = sample frequency |

• Most designs: time multiplexing

| clock frequency $\neq$ sample frequency |

$$\frac{\text{clock frequency}}{\text{sample frequency}} = \textbf{number of clock cycles available for the job}$$

• Goal: low clock frequency for low power

[Author: S. Borkar, Intel]

What can one do with 1 cm³?
Energy Storage

	J/cm³	µW/cm³/year
Micro Fuel cell	3500	110
Primary battery	2880	90
Secondary battery	1080	34
Ultra-capacitor	100	3.2

© J. Rabaey - 06

Power-Intro 20

One AAA battery: 1300 to 5000 Joule

Power and Energy are not the same!

- Power = P = I x V (current x voltage) (= Watt)
  - instantaneous
  - Typically checked for cooling or for peak performance
- Energy = Power x execution time (= Joule)
  - Battery content is expressed in Joules
  - Gives idea of how much Joules to get the job done

  Low power processor ≠ low energy solution !

- Low clock for low power does not necessarily result in low energy …

Heat and parallelism

Reduce power = reduce WASTE !!

M | P

| memory | processor |

C

Power (Heat)

$P_{mono} = CV^2f$ (Watt)

M/4 P/4   M/4 P/4   M/4 P/4   M/4 P/4

C/4   C/4   C/4   C/4

$4(C/4)V^2(f/4) = P_{mono}/4$

but since f ~ V

can be even $P_{mono}/4^3$

TREND: MULTI-CORE!!

Medical implants

- Power is limited
  - Cooling!!
  - Implanted devices only temperature $\Delta < 1\ °C$

- Battery is limited
  - Pace maker battery is not rechargeble

- Budget is less than 0.5 microWatt

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Cost of wireless links

Red: Transmit Energy - nJ/ bit
Blue: Transmit Power - mWatt
Green: Transmit Energy - nJ/bit/m

[source: G. Dolmans IMEC NL]

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
Budget is 1 micro Joule

Back of the envelope calculation
Transmit budget
- 300 bits in BAN (Body Area Network)
- 11 bits Bluetooth
- 3 bits Zigbee

Cost of crypto primitives

Energy - flexibility trade-off

Illustrate with examples

- Example 1: Secret Key: AES
- Example 2: NIST SHA3 – how not to do it
- Example 3: Public key, ECC for RFID
- Example 4: light weight algorithms?
- Example 5: cost of physical security

Example: Rijndael/AES

- key length: 16/24/32 bytes
- block length: 16/24/32 bytes

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
Efficiency - adapt HW platform to application

Simple example: Key Schedule for secret key

Two options:

- On the "fly" = just in time processing
- Pre-compute and store in memory

128

AES ← Key Schedule

Key Schedule → Memory

1408

AES

Typical for Hardware
1 cycle/round

Typical for Software
Minimum around **10 cycles/byte**

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Throughput – Energy numbers

AES 128bit key 128bit data	Throughput	Power	Figure of Merit (Gb/s/W)
0.18μm CMOS	3.84 Gbits/sec	350 mW	11 (1/1)
FPGA [1]	1.32 Gbit/sec	490 mW	2.7 (1/4)
ASM StrongARM [2]	31 Mbit/sec	240 mW	0.13 (1/85)
Asm Pentium III [3]	648 Mbits/sec	41.4 W	0.015 (1/800)
C Emb. Sparc [4]	133 Kbits/sec	120 mW	0.0011 (1/10.000)
Java [5] Emb. Sparc	450 bits/sec	120 mW	0.0000037 (1/3.000.000)

[1] Amphion CS5230 on Virtex2 + Xilinx Virtex2 Power Estimator
[2] Dag Arne Osvik: 544 cycles AES – ECB on StrongArm SA-1110
[3] Helger Lipmaa PIII assembly handcoded + Intel Pentium III (1.13 GHz) Datasheet
[4] gcc, 1 mW/MHz @ 120 Mhz Sparc – assumes 0.25 u CMOS
[5] Java on KVM (Sun J2ME, non-JIT) on 1 mW/MHz @ 120 MHz Sparc – assumes 0.25 u CMOS

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Match between algorithm & platform

Close the gap:
- Dedicated HW: ASIC, SOC
- Programmable HW: FPGA
- Custom instructions, hand-coded assembly
- Compiled code
- JAVA on virtual machine, compiled on a real machine

Application

Power

Cost

ASIC

Fixed

???

Platform

General Purpose

Energy - flexibility trade-off

---

1 microJoule

- 11000 bits AES (optimized version)
- 3000 to 10K gates area = small

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SHA3 – competition:

One size fits all

"Flexibility" Requirements

The draft minimum acceptability requirements for candidate hash algorithms are:

A.1   The algorithm must be publicly disclosed and available on a worldwide, non-exclusive, royalty-free basis.

A.2   The algorithm must be implementable in a wide range of hardware and software platforms.

A.3   The algorithm must support 224, 256, 384, and 512-bit message digests, and must support a maximum message length of at least 264 bits.

- Wide range of platforms
- Wide range of message digests

[of course, also security requirements]

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SHA-3: "cost" requirements

Computational efficiency essentially refers to the throughput of an implementation. NIST will use the

C.2.2   Memory requirements: The memory required for hardware and software implementations of the candidate algorithm will be considered during the evaluation process.

Memory requirements will include such factors as gate counts for hardware implementations, and code size and RAM requirements for software implementations.

- Power consumption?
- Energy to hash one message?

SHA3- results

- NIST asks for a Swiss knife

Bread knife

Surgeon's knife

- But often you need a specialized knife
- Certainly for embedded applications

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SHA 3 ASIC (90nm) synthesis

	Throughput (@ 250MHz)	Gate (GE)	Energy (pJ/bit)
SHA256	2000	12K	2
Blake	6000	30K	2.5
Grøstl	13000	86K	2.5
JH	4600	30K	2
Keccak	15000	30K	1
Skein	6700	43K	6

[slide input: Miroslav Knežević]

1 microJoule

- 11000 bits AES encryption
- 500 bits SHA3 hash, 30K gates

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Example 3:Public key - Elliptic Curve Cryptography

Push for lowest energy
to fit budget of RFID

Challenge: low power public key …

Address at all design abstraction levels!

- **Protocol** : asymmetric (most work for the reader)
- **Algorithm**: Elliptic curve (163 bits) instead of RSA (min 1024 bits)
- **Field Operation**: Binary and not Prime fields: easier field operations
- **Projective** coordinate system: (X, Y, Z) instead of (x,y): no field inversions
- **Special coordinate system**: no need to store Y coordinates (Lopez-Dahab) and common Z (only one Z coordinate)
- **Minimize storage**: Only 5 registers (with mult/add/square unit) or 6 registers (with mult/add-only unit) compared to 9+ registers before.

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Computation needs

Schnorr

ECC

Scalar
multiplication

Point
operations

Combination of
$GF(2^n)$ operations

Basic $GF(2^n)$ operations

- One (simple) Schnorr protocol requires **one** elliptic curve point multiplication (compared to **two** at the reader)
- One point multiplication with Montgomery ladder requires **N** point additions & doublings (N = key length)
- With modified Lopez –Dahab common Z coordinate, one point addition and point doubling requires **7** field multiplications, **4** squarings and **3** additions
- One field multiplication requires 163/d clock cycles (d= digit size).

For digit size 4, 79000 cycles (should stay below 100K)

Step 3: EC Point Multiplication

k·P
Scalar
Multiplication

⟹ Montgomery Algorithm

≈600 GE (Control)

P+Q, 2·P
Point Addition,
Point Doubling

⟹ Lopez-Dahab Algorithm

≈1.2k GE (Control)
+ 6×163 registers

a+b, a·b, a^2
Modular Arithmetic Operation
(Addition, Multiplication, Squaring)

⟹ Sakiyama Modular ALU

≈900 GE (Control)
+ 3×163 registers

Total Area = 2.7 GE (Control) + 9×163 registers   **≈ 80% !!**

* GE: Gate Equivalent (a 2-input NAND)

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Results

- Results: ECC co-processor that can compute:
  - ECC point multiplications (163 by 4)
  - Scalar modular operations (8 bit processor with redundancy)
- Schnorr (secure ID transfer, but no tracking protection): **one** PM
- More advanced protocols: up to **four** PM on tag
- 14K gates, 79K cycles
- At 500 KHz, corresponds to 30 microWatt and 158 msec
- One point multiplication = **4.8 microJoule**

RFID co-processor prototype

- Combination full-custom – standard cells
- HW and SW co-design
- Side channel testing in progress

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1 microJoule

- 11000 bits AES encryption
- 500 bits SHA3 hash
- 1/5 of one point multiplication

Still to add physical security …
(i.e. side-channel and fault attack resistant)

Communication & computation

Back of the envelope

1 micro Joule

Transmission:
- 300 bits in BAN
- 11 bits Bluetooth
- 3 bits Zigbee

Encryption:
- 11000 bits AES
- 500 bits SHA3 hash
- 1/5 of one point multiplication

Ignores receive buget (= listening)
Ignores "overhead" of adding authentication bits, etc.

Example1 : Mutual Authentication Symmetric shared key

Reader: K

Tag: K

r_B

r_A

$$r_B \longrightarrow$$

r_B

$$T_1 \longleftarrow$$

$T_1 \leftarrow E_K(r_A /\!/ r_B)$

check r_B
compute r_A

*Check response
= decryption*

$$T_2 \longrightarrow$$

$T_2 \leftarrow E_K(r_B /\!/ r_A)$

Tag: two AES encryptions, one transmission over Bluetooth
128 bit Bluetooth + 2 x AES ≈ 10 microJoule

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ECC based randomized Schnorr

Reader: $y, X = xP$

Tag: $x, Y = yP$

$r_1, r_2,$

T_1, T_2 ←

$T_1 = r_1P, T_2 = r_2Y$

c

c →

$v = r_1 + r_2 + cx$

v ←

$c^{-1}[vP - T_1 - y^{-1}T_2] = ? X$

Tag: two point multiplications, two transmissions over BAN
Crypto dominates ≈ 4 microJoule + 1 microJoule

Physical security??

Countermeasures against physical
attacks, i.e. side-channel and fault
attacks

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Attacks vs. countermeasures

Passive SCA
Timing analysis
Simple power analysis
Differential power analysis
Template attack

Balanced PA/PD
Double-and-add-always
Montgomery Powering Ladder⊥

Attackers need only a single successful attack to win.

Active SCA
M safe-error
C safe-error
Invalid points
Invalid curves
Twist curves
Sign-change attacks
Differential faults

Base point blinding
Random projective coordinates
Randomized EC isomorphism
Randomized field isomorphism
Point validity check
Curve integrity check
Coherence check

[source: Junfeng Fan]

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Attacks vs. countermeasures

√ : Effective   -- : Irrelevant
× : Attacked   H : helps the attack
? : Unclear

[source: Junfeng Fan]

Countermeasures	Passive Attacks							Active Attacks						
								Safe-error		Weak curve			Differential	
	TA	SPA	Template	DPA	Comparative SCA	RPA/ZPA	Carry-based attack	M safe-error	C safe-error	Invalid point	Invalid curve	Twist curve	Sign change	Differential
Balanced PA/PD	√	√	--	--	?	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Double-and-add-always	√	√	--	--	×	--	--	--	×H	--	--	--	--	--
Montgomery Powering Ladder⊥	√	√	--	--	×	×	--	√	√	--	--	H	√	--
Montgomery Powering Ladder⊤	√	√	--	--	×	×	--	√	√	--	--	√	--	--
Random scalar split	--	--	?	√	?	√	×	--	?	--	--	√	?	?
Scalar randomization	--	--	×	×	×	√	×	--	?	--	--	--	?	?
Base point blinding	--	--	×	×	×	√	--	--	--	?	--	--	--	?
Random projective coordinates	--	--	√	√	?	×	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	?
Randomized EC isomorphism	--	--	?	√	?	×	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	?
Randomized field isomorphism	--	--	?	√	?	×	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	?
Point validity check	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	H	√	?	√	H	√
Curve integrity check	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	?	√	--	--	--
Coherence check	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	H	--	?	--	√	√

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Prototype IC – ThumbPodII

- AES, controller, fingerprint processor.

secure
WDDL
differential route

insecure
single-ended

Area: factor 2.5   **Power: factor 3 to 4 !**

Design Method: Security Partitioning

Server

Client → root-of-trust

Protocol/Algorithm-level validation

Architecture-level attacks

Noncritical software

Matching & Crypto SW

Architecture-level validation

Microarchitecture-level attacks

Software driver

Matching & Crypto HW

Microarchitecture-level validation

Circuit-level attacks

DPA-resistant HW

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
Security partitioning - SOC

Thumbpod-II
- Processor & co-process[...]
- Security partitioning
  – Secure ASIC
 – Regular processor

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1 micro Joule

Transmission:
- 300 bits in BAN
- 11 bits Bluetooth
- 3 bits Zigbee

Encryption:
- 11000 bits AES
- 500 bits SHA3 hash
- 1/5 of one point multiplication

Easily 100% overhead for physical security

Conclusions

- Power is not same as energy !
- Energy - flexibility trade-off = orders of magnitude !
- Communication- computation trade-off !

- Low budget is needed, but not there yet.
- Research topics:
  - Light weight crypto
  - Physically entangled crypto, link to PUFs and other devices
  - Design methods for security partitioning
- because:
  ### weakest link decides strength of chain